University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Arts - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

January 2006

The Emperor’s New Scar: The Ethics of Placebo Surgery
D. A. Neil
University of Wollongong, dneil@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Neil, D. A., The Emperor’s New Scar: The Ethics of Placebo Surgery 2006.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/artspapers/56

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

David Neil
Wollongong University
New South Wales
Australia

The Emperor’s New Scar: The Ethics of Placebo Surgery

Surgical innovation is something of a grey area in medical research. Relative to other
doctors, surgeons exercise a high degree of discretion in the trialing of new techniques
with their patients. The first patients to undergo a new procedure are, in a real sense,
subjects in an experiment. It is always hoped that a new procedure will deliver a clinical
benefit but, as often as not, trial means error. The front-line patients bear a higher burden
of risk, with lower expectation of success than subsequent patients, who benefit from the
experience gained in the early attempts.
While experimentation is as intrinsic to the progress of surgery as any other field
of medicine, nowhere is surgical innovation regulated by the kinds of guidelines and
oversight required in other human experimentation. One recent study1 identified 59
papers in US medical journals (1992-2000) which described innovative surgery. A
questionnaire was then sent to the authors. Of those surgeons who responded, the
majority had not submitted their proposal to an Institutional Review Board and a majority
had not mentioned the innovative nature of the procedure on the informed consent form.
Two thirds of the respondents stated that government regulation for the protection of
human subjects of innovative surgical research would not be appropriate. The authors of
this study locate the source of these surgeons’ attitudes in a tradition in surgery whereby
new techniques, and even new devices, ‘are regarded as mere modifications and not as
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research’.2 Thus surgical innovations often bypass processes in place to protect human
subjects. Elsewhere, the same authors have noted that:

The majority of surgical publications involve interventional case reports that
consist of a series of patients; outcome measures are usually clinical parameters
that are obtained during routine clinical follow-up, without any type of formal
written protocol. The implicit assumption in these case reports is that the clinical
hypothesis is not formalized until after the therapeutic intervention. These types
of ‘informal research’ are viewed as clinical care and are therefore invisible to
IRBs.3

This kind of informal surgical research is at odds with the increasing trend towards
evidence-based medicine. Concerns about the evidential basis for procedures is not
limited to novel techniques. Many procedures that were once common have since been
abandoned when more rigorous evaluation has disproved their presumed benefits; routine
tonsillectomy for instance.4 Suppose we accept that, in principle, there is a clear need for
more rigorous and objective standards for assessing new surgical procedures. In practice
this will mean randomized control trials, and this is ethically problematic because unlike
placebo sugar pills, surgical placebos are not benign.
Randomized, double-blind, placebo controlled trials are widely recognized as the
gold standard for drug trials. Such trials are the most effective way to control for both
investigator bias and the placebo effect. A few surgical trials have also been conducted
with a placebo control. Patients on the placebo arm of the trial receive ‘sham’, or
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‘imitation’ surgery (as it is sometimes called) such that the patient cannot know whether
she received the trial procedure or not. Placebo surgery typically involves anesthesia and
an incision equivalent to the incision needed for the actual surgery. To maximize
equivalence between the trial and control groups it may also involve the same postoperative drug therapy given to the recipients of the ‘real’ surgery. These trials have
proven highly controversial. Placebo surgery obviously involves risks that are not there
with placebo pills. Critics of placebo controlled surgical trials (PCST) claim that such
trials are straightforwardly unethical because they violate the doctor’s duty to act only in
the best interests of the patient.5 These trials expose patients to some of the normal risks
of surgery without any reasonable expectation of benefit. Defenders of PCST point to
their considerable scientific value. They argue that without properly designed trials for
new procedures we cannot identify false positives and determine their real effectiveness,
and in some cases well designed clinical trials require a placebo control.6
The use of placebo surgery to control for the placebo effect in the evaluation of
surgical procedures was first advocated by Henry Beecher in 1961.7 There Beecher
discussed two PCST, conducted in the late 1950’s, to test the efficacy of ligation of the
internal mammary artery for the treatment of angina; a common treatment at the time.
Both trials showed that the procedure was no more effective than the placebo, and the
operation was subsequently abandoned. These two trials together enrolled 35 subjects and
probably prevented thousands of unnecessary operations.8 We will examine here two
more recent trials which have generated some controversy. First a brief description of
these trials:
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Fetal Cell Transplants for Parkinson’s Disease
Parkinson’s disease is a motor function disorder characterized by tremors, rigidity,
slowness of movement, impaired gait, loss of balance and postural stability. Its main
pathological feature is a loss of dopamine producing neurons in a particular area of the
brain. The drug ‘Levadopa’ (a dopamine precursor) is the standard treatment. It is
effective at controlling symptoms in the early and middle stages of the disease, but is
often ineffective in advanced patients, and the higher doses needed have serious side
effects. In animal models it has been shown that ‘dopaminergic neurons’ harvested from
embryos and transplanted to the damaged areas can to some extent regrow the damaged
neural structures and reverse the loss of motor control. The transplantation of embryonic
cells into the brains of human sufferers has been undertaken in a number of centers
around the world. One study reports around 360 transplant procedures at 17 centers to
1999.9 Results have been mixed, but some centers have claimed to consistently produce
significant improvement in patients.
However strong and persistent placebo effects have been reported in the treatment
of Parkinson’s disease. In one large, double-blind drug trial, patients in the placebo group
had a 20-30 percent improvement in motor scores, which persisted throughout the six
months of the trial.10 Because of the wide variations in response to drugs for Parkinson’s
disease, placebo effects are a major issue in the evaluation of new drugs. Consequently it
is possible that the claimed clinical benefits of fetal tissue transplants are actually a
placebo effect, or are exaggerated by investigator bias.
One reason why the procedure has always been highly controversial is that the
fetal tissue is obtained from aborted fetuses 6.5 to 9 weeks old, but concerns relating to
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the moral status of embryos are not at issue here. In the US a ban on federal support for
the medical use of fetal tissue was lifted by President Clinton in 1993. The National
Institute of Health subsequently agreed to fund two randomized control trials to assess
the efficacy of the procedure.
The first trial involved 40 patients with advanced Parkinson’s disease, for whom
drug therapy had become ineffective. 11 The patients were randomly allocated to receive
either the transplant or a placebo operation. Each transplant patient received tissue taken
from four fetuses, injected into the damaged areas on both sides of the brain. For the
patients given the placebo, risks and discomforts included: a local anesthetic, placing of
stereotactic equipment, a scalp incision and the drilling of burr holes (not all the way
through the skull). This study reported no significant difference between the transplant
and the placebo groups. Unfortunately, in five of the transplant patients the grafts grew
too well and these patients suffered uncontrollable involuntary movements and muscle
spasms, probably due to an excess of dopamine.
The second Parkinson’s trial was designed to address some questions raised by
the first trial, which concerned immunological effects and the comparison of different
amounts of transplant tissue.12 This trial had three arms. In one arm patients received
tissue from four fetal sources. In the second arm they received a smaller amount of tissue
from just one fetus and the third arm was the placebo control. The patients on the placebo
arm faced the additional risks of a general anesthetic, low-dose immunosuppresant
therapy (cyclosporine), the radio-isotopes used in the brain imaging as well as the other
risks present in the earlier trial. The published results of this second trial showed no
overall treatment effect. There was early improvement in some of the patients with less
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severe symptoms, who received the higher amount of fetal tissue. However thirteen of the
transplant patients (more than half) developed dyskenesias (uncontrollable movement)
and three needed further surgery to relieve this serious side-effect. Subjects enrolled in
the trial were told that if they received the placebo, and the transplants proved safe and
effective, they would then be offered the procedure at no cost. In a paper published in
advance of the trial, aiming to justify the trial design, the experimenters listed the risks
described above, the measures taken to minimize those risks, and described the benefits
thus:

The benefits of participating in the placebo group include contributing to
advances in the treatment of a disease of great personal interest to the participants,
receiving standard medical treatment at no cost, having the opportunity to obtain a
fetal-tissue transplant at no cost if the procedure proves to be safe and effective,
and being spared the risks associated with transplantation if it proves to be unsafe
or ineffective.13

In fact the trials showed a higher than expected mortality rate, a high rate of serious side
effects and a significant placebo effect such that there was no statistically significant
difference in benefits for the transplant group and the trial group. The results give rise to
serious doubts about a procedure which has been undergone by hundreds of patients.
Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis of the Knee
Patients with osteoarthritis of the knee, and for whom medical therapy has failed
to relieve the pain, often choose to undergo one of two surgical procedures: arthroscopic
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lavage or débridement. The lavage procedure involves flushing the joint with at least ten
liters of fluid through arthroscopic cannulas, in order to remove debris. The débridement
procedure is usually performed after lavaging the joint, and involves shaving away rough
cartilage and trimming torn or degenerated meniscal fragments, and then smoothing the
remaining meniscus. A study conducted in Texas assessed both surgical procedures
against a placebo.14 In this study a total of 180 patients were randomly assigned to
arthroscopic débridement, arthroscopic lavage or placebo surgery. All the procedures
were performed by one surgeon. Patients were assessed over a 24 month period after
surgery, to assess improvements in pain and function. The surgeons had no role in the
follow-up assessment of the patients, and the assessors were blinded to the treatment
group assignment. For the placebo surgery, patients did not receive a standard general
anesthetic, but instead were given an intravenous tranquilizer and an opioid, which is
safer. Three one centimeter incisions were made, and a débridement procedure was
simulated, but no arthroscopic instruments were inserted into the knee. Placebo patients
spent the night after the procedure in hospital, and their nurses were also unaware of the
treatment group assignment. There were two minor postoperative complications in the
placebo group: one patient developed a wound infection, which was treated with
antibiotics, and another developed calf swelling in the leg that had undergone surgery.
Patients in all three groups received the same postoperative care: the same walking aids,
the same exercise program and the same analgesics. The study found that the outcomes
for both surgical procedures were no better than those after a placebo procedure. The
authors concluded that, if their findings are correct, ‘the billions of dollars spent on such
procedures annually might be put to better use’.15
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The Dilemma of Placebo Surgery
The moral dilemma presented by PCST is an instructive instance of the kind of dilemma
that arises when the imperatives of research are in tension with the imperatives of clinical
care. The real source of this dilemma is that the competing normative considerations are
grounded in distinct and opposed ethical theories. The claim that doctors have an
inviolable obligation to act only in the best interests of their patients appeals to a deontic
conception of patients’ rights and doctors’ duties. However the doctor’s duty to do what
is ‘best’ for her patient has an implicit temporal index. The object of the duty is a
particular, present patient and the duty of care is a duty to offer that patient treatment in
accordance with current medical wisdom about best practice. The object of research,
however, is not this or that patient but a condition in general. Research on therapies
assumes that current best practice is not the best possible practice and aims to provide
future patients with more effective therapies than are presently available.
For the most part we cannot say which individuals will benefit from today’s
research. Research brings benefits to a class of people – future Parkinson’s patients, for
instance – and for this reason the justification of research typically appeals to utilitarian
arguments. From a utilitarian perspective dangers to research subjects can be justified
when the potential benefits of new medical knowledge sufficiently outweigh the
unavoidable risks of the research needed to gain that knowledge. In the case of surgical
research the surgeon is both researcher and treating doctor, and the moral requirements of
both roles are not easily reconciled.
In an influential article Ruth Macklin characterizes the dilemma as one ‘between
the highest standard of research design and the highest standard of ethics’16. It is
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misleading, I think, to describe the problem as a tension between good science and good
ethics, as if the only ethical considerations concern the protection of research subjects. If
the benefits of good science did not carry moral weight – if all the ethical reasons pulled
in one direction – then there would be no moral dilemma. Certainly, historically, the
principal concern of research ethics has been the protection of subjects. However, the
time frame over which research results are ultimately incorporated into standard practice
is such that much medical research does not directly benefit the experimental subjects; so
if research ethics is only about the protection of subjects then most medical research
would be unjustifiable. The most effective way to minimize harms caused by research
would simply be to do no research. In reality the approval process for research proposals
standardly involves judgments about the importance of the research in terms of future
benefits. For the most part what justifies risks imposed on research subjects is the utility
of the knowledge to be gained, and much of the ambiguity in research ethics arises from
the fact that there are no widely accepted methods for ethically evaluating these tradeoffs.
Macklin compares PCST to placebo controlled drug trials and finds that the
justification for the latter cannot be extended to the former. Experimental drugs are
normally trialed against the current standard treatment. It is considered acceptable to use
a placebo control only when a drug is being trialed for a condition for which there is no
effective drug available.

The chief reason [why PCST is unethical] is that performing a surgical procedure
that has no expected benefit other than the placebo effect violates the ethical and
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regulatory principle that the risk of harm to subjects must be minimized in the
conduct of research… It is undeniable that performing surgery in research
subjects that has no potential therapeutic benefit fails to minimize the risk of
harm. An alternative research design that did not involve sham surgery would
pose a lower risk of harm to the subjects in the control group of the study. But
herein lies the tension between the scientific and ethical standards: the alternative
design would be less rigorous from a methodologic point of view.17

This argument is too quick and the problem lies in the ambiguity of the meaning of
‘minimizing risk’. If ‘minimizing risk to research subjects’ is construed in an unrestricted
sense then risks are minimized by doing no research. Of course that is not the sense in
play here. The relevant notion of ‘minimizing risk’ is relational and only has determinate
content relative to a specified objective. The power of a study determines the confidence
with which general conclusions may be inferred from the experimental results.
Uncontroversially, for any given study, we want the safest possible study design. If two
candidate study designs will answer the same question with the same confidence level the
design carrying the least risk is to be rationally preferred. Two studies which cannot
answer the same question with the same confidence are effectively two different studies.
One study may involve less risk than another in an absolute sense, but ‘minimizing’ does
not just mean ‘lessening’. One does not minimize the risks of football by deciding to play
chequers instead. It is important not to confuse the idea of ‘minimizing risk’, in the sense
of finding the safest design for a study, with the distinct question of whether the best
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achievable risk-benefit balance for a proposed study is ultimately acceptable or
unacceptable.
Macklin’s argument has been criticized by Franklin Miller, in an article defending
the claim that PCST (or ‘sham surgery’ as he calls it) can sometimes be justified.18 Miller
rejects Macklin’s understanding of the requirement to minimize risk, along similar lines
to the criticism above. But Miller’s defense of PCST is flawed. His main charge is that
critics of PCST are ‘conflating the ethics of clinical research with the ethics of clinical
care’. Miller accepts the argument that ‘judged by the surgical standard of care’ it is
wrong to perform placebo surgery on a patient because ‘surgeons do not perform surgery
unless they judge it to be in the best interests of the patient’. Miller argues, however, that
this is not the right perspective from which to evaluate PCST. A randomized clinical trial
is ‘not a form of personal medical therapy’, but is rather ‘a scientific tool for evaluating
treatments’. Miller notes that not just clinical trials but a wide range of disease studies
involve painful or potentially harmful interventions without any prospect of medical
benefit to the participants. These risks to participants are generally judged acceptable
when the risks are minimized, are not excessive and the research stands to produce
valuable knowledge.

Clinical research, including treatment trials, would be impossible if it were held to
the ethical standard of promoting the medical best interests of patients that
governs therapeutic medicine. These ethically significant differences between
clinical research and medical care – differences in purpose, methods, and
justification of risks imply that it is erroneous to hold that clinical research should
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be governed by the same ethical standards as apply to the practice of medicine.
Sham surgery is not unethical just because it exposes patients to risks that are not
compensated by medical benefits. Sham surgery as a control should be evaluated
in terms of the ethical requirements proper to clinical research.19

This is a very striking claim – that research participants and patients inhabit two distinct
ethical regimes and the exigencies of research demand that the research participants
cannot be protected in the same way that ordinary patients are. One important difficulty
with this idea is that people enrolled in studies are often both patient and research subject
and there is no clear demarcation between research and treatment in many cases. Even if
we could always categorize interventions as belonging to either research or clinical care,
we may ask how is it that undertaking research confers on the researchers permission to
take certain risks with the health of subjects that would be impermissible in the clinical
context? The claim here is not that one consistent set of ethical principles has different
practical implications in different contexts, but that clinical care and medical research are
properly regulated according to different principles. Miller’s argument seems to be that
because medical research sometimes requires doing things to participants that are not in
their best interests, and because research can have valuable outcomes, such risks are
therefore justifiable. Yet he accepts that in the context of clinical care it is always wrong
to act against a patient’s best interest. It may well be true that it is practically impossible
to conduct medical research without exposing subjects to risks without any expectation of
a health benefit. However, this is not a moral argument. Moral requirements are not
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proved on grounds of pragmatic necessity. Although it is not explicitly acknowledged
Miller’s conception of the ethics of clinical research clearly has a utilitarian character.

The ultimate question of risk-benefit assessment is whether the risks of sham
arthroscopic surgery were justified by the anticipated scientific value of the study.
We lack any objective tools for measuring research risk-benefit ratios. I contend
that the relatively minor risks of the methodologically-indicated sham procedure
were justifiable to answer the clinically important question of whether
arthroscopic surgery is effective to treat pain associated with arthritis of the knee.
This is a matter of judgment about which reasonable people might differ.20

Where Macklin opposes the ‘standards of research’ with the ‘standards of ethics’, Miller
finds that there are two standards of ethics – one for research and one for clinical care.
But we are not given any principled reason for the division between these domains. Why
should the deontic constraints that regulate the doctor-patient relationship suddenly give
out at the boundary between treatment and research? Why is the surgeon-qua-researcher
entitled to appeal to utilitarian justifications that are forbidden to the surgeon-qua-doctor?
At bottom the reason why PCST is such a difficult and divisive issue is simply
that this is a case where utilitarian and deontic principles conflict sharply. The dilemma
cannot be resolved by simply ruling one or other of these moral perspectives out of court.
The utilitarian focuses on the comparative magnitude of risks and benefits and abstracts
away from their distribution. From a utilitarian perspective both the Parkinson’s and knee
surgery PCST described above were straightforwardly justifiable. In the case of the
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Parkinson’s trial the researchers, in their paper published before the trial, offered this
rationale:

The inclusion of a placebo group in our study of 36 subjects will permit us to
establish whether the benefit observed to date can be attributed to an effect of
treatment apart from a placebo effect. If fetal-tissue transplants are found to be
safe and effective, thousands of patients with Parkinson’s disease stand to benefit,
and further research will be encouraged. If the transplants are found to be unsafe
or ineffective, or if they offer nothing more than a placebo effect, hundreds or
even thousands of patients will be spared the risks and financial burdens of an
unproved operation.21

Note that the trial is justified here in terms of benefits to future patients. When we
consider, in addition, the flow-on effects of reallocating resources away from ineffective
procedures, the utility sums clearly weigh in favor of such trials.
The deontic objection to this utilitarian argument concerns not the relative
magnitude of risks and benefits but their distribution. Those who bear the risk of placebo
surgery are not likely to be the direct beneficiaries of the knowledge obtained; and even
where they do later benefit from improvements in treatment, other patients are effectively
free-riders on the risks shouldered by the trial participants. There are various ways in
which this kind of objection might be phrased. In Kantian terms the subjects are treated
as means rather than ends. In Rawlsian terms fairness constraints are violated by making
some individuals worse off for the benefit of others. The general form of the deontic
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objection to PCST is that such trials involve using patients in a way that is inconsistent
with the duty to respect each individual patient’s autonomy.
An unrestricted application of utilitarian reasoning would sanction research even
where the subjects face substantial and certain harms, provided the research would lead to
clearly greater benefits. For instance, imagine that one of the above trials was conducted
without informing the subjects that the trial involved a placebo control. Such a trial
would be quickly rejected by any ethics committee, although it might in fact be even
better from a purely scientific perspective. Because utilitarianism does not give
appropriate weight to the protection of individuals and their autonomy, contemporary
standards in research ethics surround research subjects with various deontic protections.
However, as Miller has observed, an absolute prohibition on harming some for the
benefit of others would simply rule out a great part of medical research.
Clearly research on humans is subject to some deontic constraints, and the debate
around PCST is really about where to draw those limits. In practice, all the stress tends to
fall on consent. Consent is the means of reconciling, or at least appearing to reconcile,
these conflicting obligations. As long as the subject is informed of the risks and gives a
valid consent it appears that autonomy has been respected and researchers can go ahead
and impose those risks. The moral acceptability of a PCST will hinge, then, on the quality
of consent from its subjects. What does consent to participation in a PCST need to be to
do the moral work required of it?
In the case of surgical research this tension is particularly acute. When surgical
studies are designed according to good scientific methodology, with a randomized
control, then it is uncomfortably clear that human subjects are going under the knife for
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research purposes. It is important to recognize here that surgical research has traditionally
been conducted informally and this is worse on both consequentialist and patient centered
grounds. Informal surgical research has less evidential value and the progress of surgical
practice goes more slowly and haphazardly than it otherwise might; and when patients
undergo procedures unaware that some aspect of the procedure is experimental then the
status of their consent is questionable. PCST brings to the surface a moral dilemma that
has hitherto been hidden, where surgeons have not been explicit with patients about
surgery with a research component. The literature on the ethics of PCST has, for the most
part, treated such trials in isolation and focused on the question of whether it is ever
acceptable to perform a placebo operation. What has not been noticed is that the main
arguments against PCST hold a fortiori for informal surgical research, which is the most
common mode of surgical research.

If it is determined that PCST are ethically

unacceptable then this directly raises the question of whether any experimental surgery
could be acceptable.

Expected vs. Actual Benefits
To bring this point out I want to draw attention to an important feature of the trials
described above, which complicates the comparison with drug trials. Typically a drug
trial compares a novel pharmaceutical against the standard therapy (or against placebo if
there is none). The PCST conducted so far have aimed to assess procedures that were
already in use. Before the Parkinson’s PCST were conducted fetal nigral tissue
transplants for were being performed by at least 17 centers. For arthroscopic lavage or
débridement of the knee, Mosley et. al. report that more than 650,000 such procedures
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are performed annually in the U.S. What this shows is that surgical procedures can
become widespread without the kind of evidence supporting their efficacy that is required
for the approval of new drugs. Indeed there is a long history of surgical procedures which
were once common and have since been discredited.
As Macklin puts it the ‘chief reason’ for disallowing PCST is that it is wrong to
perform a surgical procedure that ‘has no expected benefit’. So what justifies the risks of
ordinary surgery is a reasonable expectation of benefit, which raises the question of when
such expectations are reasonable? We might think that with common procedures the
benefits are well established and the probability of a poor outcome or complications is
accurately known. The arthroscopic knee surgery example shows that this is not always
true. With more radical procedures, like fetal tissue transplants to repair brain damage,
the uncertainty is greater, and centers were reporting a success rate which, it turned out,
could not be reproduced in a rigorous, randomized control trial. For patients who
received the placebo operation it seems clear that no benefit could be reasonably
expected from a ‘pretend’ operation. But was there a reasonable expectation of benefit
for the patients who received the transplants, or for the patients who underwent this
procedure in other clinics?
Expectations are probabilistic – an operation may offer a high or a low chance of
success. It is easy for expectations to be inflated by hope. What differentiates wishful
thinking from a reasonable expectation of benefit is that there is an evidence base which
supports the judgment that a beneficial outcome is probable. Where the evidence is
missing or unreliable, where patients give consent with misleading or no information
about the actual probability of benefits and harms, we cannot say that there is a
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reasonable expectation of benefit. In the Parkinson’s PCST the transplant recipients as a
group did not show better than a placebo effect and some experienced serious
complications. This means that those who received the placebo operation had roughly the
same chance of benefit and a much lower chance of harm than those who received the
transplant. It then seems odd to say that it was only the placebo procedures that were
wrong because they had no expected benefit. Correct expectations as to the probability of
benefit and harm would have offered even less comfort to those subjects who had the trial
procedure.
Patients and surgeons may subjectively expect that a procedure will work, but
subjective expectations can be sadly mistaken and the mere psychological state of
expecting a benefit does not of itself justify running a serious risk. What is required is
that benefits are reasonably expected, meaning the expectations are supported by good
evidence. The very purpose of PCST is to generate good evidence about the efficacy of
procedures in cases where it is lacking. Where reliable evidence of safety and efficacy is
not available for a surgical procedure then there are no persuasive reasons to expect a
benefit from undergoing that procedure. Imagine that you had to participate in a PCST,
but you were allowed to choose whether you receive the trial procedure or the placebo
operation. If you decide on expected utility alone the rational choice would actually be to
join the placebo group. You don’t have good reason to expect the experimental procedure
to work, but you know that you are far less likely to be harmed in the placebo arm. You
could then choose the experimental procedure later, if and when it is proven effective. If
surgery is only justified by a sound expectation of net benefit then it is not only placebo
surgery that fails to meet that standard. Now we see why PCST presents a deeper
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dilemma than its critics have realized. If we accept the principal argument against PCST
then, on the same grounds, we should object even more strenuously to speculative
procedures and informal surgical research. Yet a ban on PCST means that surgical
research remains confined to methods that are morally worse, and ineffective procedures
that would be exposed by a PCST may remain in use.

The Consent of the Desperate
When important research unavoidably requires that participants are put at risk, the moral
acceptability of that research depends heavily on the quality of consent obtained. The
Parkinson’s PCST was rightly criticized in this regard because the consent of subjects
was likely to be compromised by the ‘therapeutic misconception’. The therapeutic
misconception is a well-documented problem with patients entering drug trials;
particularly Phase 1 trials for cancer and other terminal conditions. Phase 1 drug trials are
primarily intended to determine toxicity and dosage limits and they are not designed to
yield a therapeutic benefit for the enrolled subjects. Participation in such a trial is really
an altruistic act of loaning one’s body to medical science. Nevertheless there is
considerable evidence that many patients enroll in such trials in hope of getting better. In
a paper on the therapeutic misconception in Phase 1 cancer trials, Matthew Miller writes:

Given that the remission rate is less than 1 percent and that the rate of death due
to drug toxicity is comparable, few would claim any aggregate survival advantage
for participants. In fact, consent documents state that Phase 1 cancer trials are
primarily toxicity studies and that response is neither intended nor expected. Yet
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patients enrolled in these trials overwhelmingly cite hope of physical benefit
(rarely altruism) as their primary motivation for enrolling.22

How blameworthy researchers are in this regard is a difficult question. Trial subjects who
have the therapeutic misconception are being exploited. Yet the psychology of the
doctor-patient relationship makes it difficult for doctors to disabuse very sick patients of
whatever slim hopes they have. Clearly though, the therapeutic misconception fatally
compromises patient consent. Recall that participants in the Parkinson’s PCST were told
that if they received the placebo, and the procedure proved effective, they would be
offered the procedure. Such an offer implicitly invites candidates to believe that enrolling
in the trial might offer a route to recovery.
Macklin cites reports of patient anger in the Parkinson’s trial when placebo
recipients were told that, because of safety considerations, the real procedure would not
be offered. She asks if it is overly paternalistic to protect research subjects from risks they
seem willing to accept, and suggests that: ‘The emphasis today on respect for the
autonomy of patients and research subjects creates a reluctance to question whether their
choices are fully rational’.23 Macklin appears to argue that the obstacles to informed
consent are too great in this case and patients should not be offered such a choice.
Franklin Miller accepts that the therapeutic misconception may have been present in the
Parkinson’s trial but contends that this result cannot be generalized to all PCST. He
contends that the patients in the arthroscopic surgery trial were not ‘vulnerable’ because
although arthritis is painful ‘it is not associated with impaired decision-making
capacity’.24
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Perhaps ‘autonomy’ has become a buzz-word often used too carelessly to sanction
irrational patient choices. Properly understood, respect for autonomy actually demands
that we test the rationality of questionable choices and make greater efforts to help
patients understand the salient facts. Irrationality is commonplace and sick people are
especially prone to it, but that fact does not warrant a pessimistic retreat to paternalism.
Well designed PCST can yield information of great value. The problem with PCST is that
participants are asked to submit to risks without a compensating expectation of benefit to
their health. It is not irrational for a patient to believe that contributing to medical
knowledge or helping future sufferers of his condition is sufficient reason to participate in
a surgical trial. PCST are not inherently or necessarily unethical, but we must be sure that
participants understand that therapeutic benefit is not the primary goal of the trial and that
there is a high chance that they will get no health benefit. Ethics committees reviewing
proposed PCST need to be satisfied that there is adequate testing to ensure that
participant consent is not motivated by an unfounded hope of improved health. We
should expect that this will make it harder to find volunteers and if that is the price of
adequate consent then so be it.
I will conclude by pointing out that there is one obvious way to ameliorate the
problem of uncompensated harm, and that is to compensate. If participants volunteering
for surgical research suffer complications, then they should receive not just treatment but
also some monetary compensation for that suffering. Compensating for adverse outcomes
is not the same as paying participants and cannot reasonably be construed as an
inducement. My proposal is that fair compensatory payouts for various complications are
determined in advance, and that this information is part of the informed consent process. I
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believe this would help potential volunteers to appreciate the reality and relative
seriousness of the risks they are being asked to accept. Such a scheme would require
insurance coverage which would increase the cost of trials. If it is objected that this
would make surgical trials too costly, that is equivalent to an admission that the funding
of such research depends on unfair cost shifting onto trial subjects. The case of PCST
offers a stark illustration of how the costs of medical progress are disproportionately
borne by research subjects. If we are serious about eliminating exploitation in medical
research, then patients who are harmed in such studies must be compensated.
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